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ABSTRACT 
 
Reverse Auction Bidding is utilized by a significant number of enterprises for 
supply of materials and in part construction. This thesis investigates aspects of the 
Reverse Auction system using the web site developed by others to continue the work on 
understanding aspects of the impact of human personality types on the bidding results 
for a standard game. 
A game theory was developed for the Reverse Auction Bidding framework used at 
TAMU to study the results of the bids collected in a standard game. This theory 
postulated two sub-games exist inside the main Reverse Auction Bidding game. The 
main sub-game is between the buyer and the set of bidders. The second sub-game is 
between the bidders.  
The theory exists that the buyer seeks minimal costs, which must be 
acknowledged as prima facie correct for this study. Extent studies at TAMU have 
indicated that the costs distribution is non-Gaussian, indicating that the buyer’s objective 
is not achieved for all bidders. The second sub-game is between the bidders, they utilize 
the non-Gaussian component of the profit distribution to amplify individual returns. 
Bidders have been proposed into three types, and the personality has been shown to have 
some impact on the participant’s economic efficiency.  
The bid timing data from previous studies shows that the bid arrival times follows 
a Poisson process. This study aims to confirm the previous investigation that the bid 
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timing data from the Reverse Auction Bidding case studies at TAMU fits the non-
homogeneous Poisson process model. 
The study involves a game scenario consisting of six construction sites for which 
the participants were asked to bid on the construction of house slabs. This is a simple 
and repeatable construction to minimize the problems of bidding. The study also 
involved determining the personality type of the participants. The game lasts for eight 
rounds. 
The individuals were selected from the Construction Management Graduate 
program with varied experience. The hypothesis is a non-homogeneous Poisson process 
(NHPP) models the arrival time data for bidding from a number of new TAMU case 
studies within acceptable statistical limits. The hypothesis is neither proven nor 
disproven; the results from this study are moot to a large extent, except when included in 
the overall study of all of the games.  
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NOMENCLATURE 
 
The following is a list of terms associated with the reverse auction bidding game. 
These terms were defined by the previous RAB researchers at TAMU: 
Aggressive Bidder:  Willing to accept calculated risk of greater than average 
loss in pursuit of greater than average returns, first defined 
by Chouhan (2009).  
Bid:  A single entry into the game that represents a legally 
acceptable offer to complete the work assuming the bidder 
has been prequalified.  
Bidder:   An entity that submits a bid. In this game, there are usually 
three to ten bidders, and each is an individual, rather than a 
company. In van Vleet’s (2004) study, none of the bidders 
had prior experience, which is not true for Chouhan’s 
(2009) study.  
Bid Efficiency:   is the ratio of the total number of jobs won to the total 
number of bids. This is one of the postulated metrics for 
determining success in the   game.  
Case Study:   ‘Designed to study intensely one set (or unit) of 
something; for e.g. programs, cities, counties, worksites-as 
a distinct whole, with the goal of understanding the set as a 
distinct whole in its particular context. A case study 
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reveals the process and outcome at certain sites and the 
way in which these interrelate. Case studies are conducted 
primarily using qualitative techniques, but do not exclude 
quantitative data. (van Vleet, 2004)’  
Collusion:   A secret agreement between two or more parties for a 
fraudulent, illegal or deceitful purpose (van Vleet, 2004). 
Or as defined by the OED (Little, Fowler, Coulson, 
Onions, & Friedrichsen, 1973) as ‘secret agreement or 
understanding for the purpose of trickery or fraud’, is 
generally considered to be reprehensible and is usually 
illegal in a free market system, because of the economic 
distortions introduced into the market.  
Dutch Auction:  is a type of auction where the auctioneer begins with a 
high asking price which is lowered until some participant 
is willing to accept the auctioneer's price, or a 
predetermined reserve price (the seller's minimum 
acceptable price) is reached (van Vleet, 2004).  
Economic Winner:  An individual who generated the highest average returns. 
Panchal  (2007) coined this term to indicate a more 
successful player in the   game. An economic winner 
makes no direct difference to the   game for the    
player where the    player has an objective of minimizing 
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the average bid for the game. The   player sees the 
average price for purchases and a distribution of prices.  
Economic Loser:  An individual who generated the lowest average returns. 
Panchal (Panchal, 2007) coined this term to indicate a less 
successful player in the   game. An economic loser 
makes no direct difference to the   game for the   player 
where the   player has an objective of minimizing the 
average bid for the game.  
Efficiency:   The ratio of the output to the input of any system. 
Game:  a series of jobs for the construction of a reinforced 
concrete floor slab, each game lasts approximately 8 to 10 
weeks in game play time, with each round of the game 
modelling a week and occurring in a 20 minute period, 
with 15 minutes of bid time and 5 minutes of build time.  
Game theory:   A formal analysis of conflict and cooperation among 
intelligent and rational decision makers.  
Herfindahl Index: a measure of the size of firms in relationship to the 
industry and an indicator of the amount of competition 
among them. It is defined as the sum of the squares of the 
market shares of each individual firm. As such, it can 
range from 0 to 10,000, moving from a very large amount 
of very small firms to a single monopolistic producer. 
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Decreases in the Herfindahl index generally indicate a loss 
of pricing power and an increase in competition, whereas 
increases imply the opposite. The Department of Justice 
considers Herfindahl indices between 1000 and 1800 to be 
moderately concentrated and indices above 1800 to be 
concentrated. As the market concentration increases, 
competition and efficiency decrease and the chances of 
collusion and monopoly increase. (van Vleet, 2004).  
Job:  A work unit, in this case a reinforced concrete slab for a 
home builder, taking 5 working days to construct.  
Loan amount:   It is a bank loan or a guarantee taken by the bidder with 
the purpose of increasing the bidders’ job capacity. The 
cost is $500 per job.  
Loss:  negative return applied to a business undertaking after all 
operating expenses have been met.  
Lump Sum offer: A tender submitted for a lump sum amount in the game 
assumed to be for a fixed price.  
Pre-Qualified: The process of declaring competent or capable or to certify 
in advance. The purpose of pre – qualified is to maintain 
the economic competition.  
Profit:  The return received on a business undertaking after all 
operating expenses have been met.  
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Profit Efficiency:  It is the ratio of the profit made to the number of jobs won. 
This is one of the postulated metrics for determining 
success in the   game.  
Purchaser:  Either an owner or owner’s representative who organizes 
the bid or tender document.  
Reverse Auction Bidding: It is a single or multiple-item, open, descending-price 
auction. The initiator specifies the opening bid price and 
bid decrement. Each bidder submits a successively lower 
bid. At the end of the auction, the bidder with lowest bid 
value is being considered as a winner (van Vleet, 2004).  
Second Bidder Issue: It has been postulated that the lowest bidder in Reverse 
Auction Bidding is seeking to undercut the second bidder 
by the smallest quantifiable fragment, if the bidder 
understands the principles of tacit collusion (Chaudary, 
2009). The hypothesis forms the basis for future research.  
Sealed Bidding: In this type of auction, all bidders simultaneously submit bids in 
such a way that no bidder knows the bid of any other 
participant. The highest/lowest bidder is awarded the 
contract at an agreed price, all other things being equal 
(van Vleet, 2004).  
Sherman Antitrust Act:   The act, based on the constitutional power of Congress 
to regulate interstate commerce, declared illegal every 
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contract, combination (in the form of trust or otherwise), 
or conspiracy in restraint of interstate and foreign trade. 
According to Nichols (2010), the problem is tacit collusion 
does not fit within the meanings of the act, thus leading to 
the debate about the legality of RAB between contractors 
who consider it illegal or unethical and economists who 
accept the converse.  
Tacit Collusion: Seemingly independent, but parallel actions among 
competing firms (mostly oligopolistic firms) in an industry 
that achieve higher prices and profits, much as if guided by 
an explicit collusion agreement. Also termed implicit 
collusion, the distinguishing feature of tacit collusion is the 
lack of any explicit agreement. The key is that each firm 
seems to be acting independently, perhaps each responding 
to the same market conditions, but the end result is the 
same as an explicit agreement. This should be contrasted 
with explicit or overt collusion that does involve a formal, 
explicit agreement. Tacit collusion is observed in Reverse 
Auction Bidding, and is potentially related to the Second 
Bidder Issue(Chouhan, 2009). Nichols (2010) postulates 
that the α game has been observed and misunderstood as 
tacit collusion, in reality it can be viewed potentially 
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reviewed as an aggressive player seeking a better than 
average return from the profit distribution resulting from 
the α game.  
Traditional bidding:  In this type of auction all bidders simultaneously submit 
bids in such a way that no bidder knows the bid of any 
other participant. The highest/lowest bidder is assumed to 
be awarded at the price submitted provided no other 
contracts opened on the decision process (Chaudary, 
2009). 
Winners Curse: Problem faced by uninformed bidders or poor game 
players. For example, in an initial public offering 
uninformed participants are likely to purchase larger 
allotments of issues that informed participants know are 
overpriced.  
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CHAPTER I  
INTRODUCTION 
 
Objectives 
The objectives of this study are:  
 to confirm the previous investigation that the bid timing data from the 
Reverse Auction Bidding case studies at TAMU fits the non-
homogeneous Poisson process model; 
 determine the parameters for the model using a suitable goodness of fit 
test; 
 Use the new set of case studies completed since the first work by Yuan in 
2013 to confirm the findings. 
Background 
Reverse Auction Bidding is a process in which a buyer of goods and services 
continues to solicit bids from sellers until the buyer is satisfied it has received an 
acceptably low price. As used in construction, the process usually entails using a 
dedicated Internet web site. At a scheduled time, the bidding for a project opens and all 
interested bidders submit their prices to the web site. The host web site then posts the 
prices on the site for all bidders to observe. The bidders’ identities usually remain 
anonymous. Bidders are then given a certain period in which to offer any lower price 
that they may choose to submit. Thus, the auction proceeds as the “reverse” of a typical 
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bids are received after a certain period following the receipt and posting of the last bid, 
the auction is closed. Award is then made to the lowest bidder (Shankar, 2005). 
The non-homogeneous Poisson process (NHPP) model provides a model used in 
the study of eBay bid arrival timing data (Shmueli, Russo, & Jank, 2004). Yuan (2013) 
showed that a NHPP model fitted the RAB data. This research will confirm the finding 
by using a number of recent case studies not available to Yuan. 
Hypothesis 
The hypothesis is a non-homogeneous Poisson process (NHPP) models the 
arrival time data for bidding from a number of new TAMU case studies within 
acceptable statistical limits. 
Significance 
Among all characteristics of online Reverse Auction Bidding (RAB), bid arrivals 
is a crucial one for analyzing bidding dynamics, bidders’ performance in order to reveal 
bidding strategies hiding behind those datasets. With this NHPP model, some special 
phenomena like “early bidding” and “bid sniping” can be examined in future studies. 
Limitations 
 The limitations for the study are: 
 The participants of this study are selected from students in the Department of 
Construction Science for the additional case study completed for this work 
 The participants will be randomly selected and none of them has any 
experience on RAB before 
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 The types of personality won’t be controlled, although the personality type 
will be studied as part of the research as this is of ongoing interest to others 
 All games will be limited to four players as is normal in this RAB study 
 Economic and all the other conditions that may have an adverse effect on the 
bidding process are assumed steady throughout the period of this study 
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CHAPTER II 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
 The range of this literature review lists the prior work completed at TAMU in the 
period 2004 to 2013 (Chaudary, 2009; Gregory, 2006; Guhya, 2010; Gujarathi, 2008; 
Gupta, 2010; Machado, 2009; Panchal, 2007; Piper, 2013; Plumber, 2010; Saigaonkar, 
2010; Shankar, 2005; van Vleet, 2004; Zhou, 2012, Yuan 2013).  
The Reverse Auction Bidding system, is considered by some to be a new variant 
for the older Dutch auction (van Vleet, 2004). RAB has become a widely used tool in the 
construction industry. The general opinion about these electronic reverse auctions 
bidding systems is that it reduces the cost and the cycle time for the purchasers for goods 
and services. For example, GE, one of the largest electronic companies in the world, has 
stated that it reduced procurement costs due to this method (Presutti Jr, 2003). This is of 
course not yet proven. 
Like all new bidding systems, myths have arisen about the practice. Schoenherr 
and Mabert’s (2007) graph enumerates some of the myths about reverse auction as 
shown in Figure 1. 
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Figure 1: Common myths associated with online reverse auctions (Schoenherr & 
Mabret, 2007) 
 
 
 Taking the myths for left to right, it works for more than commodities, savings 
must decrease, price is the controlling factor, but the lowest price expected by the 
purchaser is not achieved, refer to the work by Guhya on this point(Guhya) 
Plusgrade is a software solution company who currently serves 13 airlines globally 
with software’s where there is a direct application of reverse auction bidding. These 
airlines using this technique allow economy class passengers after booking their ticket to 
bid for Business and First class tickets; the seat is allotted to the customer who most 
satisfies the criteria set by the Airline Company. The point is to maximize the return and 
allow the market to dictate prices, which is always more economically efficient than 
presetting a price (Hartford, 2005). 
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Other Auction Types 
This section presents a summary of other auction types and issues associated 
with the system including: 
 Traditional Types of Auctions 
o English Auctions 
o Dutch Auctions 
o Sealed First Price Auctions 
o Vickrey Auction 
o Other Types of Auctions 
o Reverse Auction Bidding 
 Reverse Auction Bidding in Construction Industry 
o Posited Savings for RAB 
o Procured Items 
o Legal Issues 
o Buyer to Seller Relationship 
o Reverse Auction Bidding Myths and Reality 
o Influence of Personality Types to Reverse Auction Bidding 
Outcome 
 Mathematical Theory of the Reverse Auction Bidding 
 Bid Arrival Timing and Other Game Issues 
 Summary 
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Traditional Types Of Auctions 
An auction is an activity where one can procure goods and services through the 
use of a bidding mechanism. Traditional auctions are based on long-standing theoretical 
foundations and tested empirical work (Parente, 2008) . There are different kinds of 
traditional auctions and Klemperer (1999) classified four main types of auctions. These 
four auctions are English auctions, Dutch auctions, sealed first price auctions and the 
Vickrey auctions.  
English Auctions 
Also known as Forward auction or ascending auction, English Auction is the most 
commonly used form of auction. It is suitable for limited supplied goods or unique sold 
items (S.Wamuziri, 2009). In English auction, the offering procedure was begun with the 
most minimal satisfactory cost for vender, normally the store cost. Each one offer after 
that point must surpass this cost.  
Thus, a vender could keep the thing from offering for short of what this store cost, 
where it has been set at the start of the bartering. Bidders then start offering over the 
things against one another by setting higher cost than the last offer. The sale ends when 
no more bidders are eager to offer a higher cost. Additionally, the thing offers at the 
most elevated offer. A dealer will hold the things, if the last offer cost does not surpass 
the opposite cost.  
The notable characteristic of English auction is that each bidder knows the level of 
the current best bid during the whole auction process (McAfee & McMillan, 1987).  
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This type of auction is used to sell antiques or artworks. The point is to maximize 
returns by allowing the market to establish the price points (Hartford, 2005). As you 
would expect for these types of auctions for topline artwork the market has developed to 
a few centralized locations in England and New York.  
Dutch Auctions 
Dutch auction, also called multiple items auctions or open descending price 
auction (Krishna, 2009), is named for the Dutch tulip auctions. It is an opposite kind of 
closeout when contrasted with the English closeout. The merchant at first calls a high 
cost. Merchant will always bring down the cost through each one round of offer until a 
bidder is at last ready to acknowledge this cost. The Dutch closeout relates the value 
paid to the time of the bartering. Specifically, the more extended the closeout goes on, 
the bring down the cost.  
In a Dutch auction, judicious bidders dependably have their own particular 
obviously satisfactory valuation of the thing available to be purchased. The closeout 
starts with a value, which is definitely over this valuation, while the bidder continues 
holding up. Once the progressively let deal value descends and achieves this sum, a 
purchaser may acknowledge this offer however get a zero benefit. Holding up more to 
offer a lower cost will expand the bidder's benefit. However, this behavior provides the 
economic risk that the bidder may end up losing the item to another bidder (S.Wamuziri, 
2009).  
So Dutch auctions drive bidders to contemplate their valuation of the thing before 
the sale and act unequivocally while offering. This type of auctions is often used for 
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perishable items (McAfee & McMillan, 1987) like flowers in the Netherland, fish in 
Israel, tobacco in Canada, and used furniture. These things are utilized by regional 
standards, as opposed to the art auctions, where the item may wind up at any area on the 
planet that a significant craft gatherer decides to live.   
Sealed First Price Auctions 
Sealed first price auction is a first price sealed bid auction (FPSB). Different from 
English auction, all bidders just simultaneously submit only one bid (Krishna, 2009). 
Like the English auction, the thing goes to the highest bidder. Frequently, a vender will 
pick the victor haphazardly from the individuals who name the same most astounding 
offer, if there is a tie. The fundamental rule of sealed first price auction is that all bidders 
could not know the bid information of other competitors before the end of the auction 
and also couldn’t adjust their own bids according to other’s bids (McAfee & McMillan, 
1987). In sealed first price auction, the bidder gets three options. They are  
 to bid his/her full valuation 
 to bid a shaded value of the full valuation 
 to bid considerably under the valuation(S.Wamuziri, 2009).  
Option 3 may lead the bidder to losing the offer to their rivals, while option 1 could pick 
up the bidder no benefit if their offer was effective. Thus, balanced offering procedure 
for fixed first value closeout ought to be offering with a shaded estimation of the full 
valuation. With this approach, the bidder could make a benefit and win the offer in the 
meantime. The bidder picks up more benefit with higher shaded worth held. An excess 
of shaded quality may build the danger of losing the offer.  
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So, this kind of auction forces bidders to guess the valuation of others’ and bid a 
little more than this amount (S. Wamuziri & Abu-Shaaban, 2005). This auction was used 
for construction procurement in UK. Construction there is often based on the work by 
the Quantity Surveyor who provides an estimate of the construction costs to the 
purchaser (RICS, 2000); this system has a number of economic advantages for the 
purchaser in having: 
 a pre-bid estimate from an estimating expert 
 a consistent set of quantity take offs guaranteed by an independent expert 
 a standard for the quantity methods that is agreed across the industry 
 a document that has been tested in the courts 
Vickrey Auction 
Fixed second value auction is like fixed first value auction, where all offer will 
be fixed and uncovered in the meantime. What makes them distinctive is that the winner 
of this sort of auction just needs to pay the second most highest value offer other than the 
most astounding one. It is likewise called Vickrey closeout to celebrate the economist 
who first set forward that this sort of activity as it pushes every bidders to offer their 
actual valuations (S. Wamuziri, 2009). By and large, the best procedure of fixed second 
value auction is to offer the genuine quality, which is indistinguishable to English 
closeout. However, they have different information transparency (S. Wamuziri, 2009), 
since sealed second price auction needs  information transparency. 
In addition, each bidder is in a passive condition. As a result, sealed second price 
auction is seldom used in practice. A sealed second price auction is a very good tool to 
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model bidder‘s behavior, since bidder needs to bid their true value. Vijay (Krishna, 
2009) pointed out that sealed second price auction is in some ways similar to proxy 
bidding system, which is used by Internet auction site like eBay. In eBay, a bidder who 
bided the highest is awarded the bid by actually paying the current highest bid plus the 
current bidding increment (Krishna, 2009). 
Other Types Of Auctions 
Other than those four sorts of auction said above, there are still some different 
sorts, in the same way as Japanese auction, Take-it-or-leave-abandon it auction and 
Candle auction. In a Japanese auction, the value ascends through each one round of 
offer. Every bidder shows on the off chance that they are ready to stay at the current 
value level for each one round. When a bidder stops, the bidder won't reemerge the 
auction. In Take-it-or-abandon it auction, the vender proclaims the cost of each one task, 
and bidder can pick acknowledge ("take"), which heads the end of auction, or reject 
("leave") the offer, after which dealer goes to the following. The clear advantage of this 
type of auction is that protect the private valuation information (S. Wamuziri, 2009). In 
Candle auction, the bid is awarded to the last bid price before a candle burns out (S. 
Wamuziri & Abu-Shaaban, 2005). This is similar to the RAB where a timer runs out.  
Reverse Auction Bidding 
Reverse Auction Bidding is a relatively new type of procurement method, where 
the roles of the bidder and seller are reversed. This has been studied for about 20 years.  
And is regarded as an internet-based system. This new type of auction was known as 
Business-to-Business (B2B) Reverse Auction in mid-1990'online  (Schoenherr & 
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Mabert, 2007). The establishment of Web auctions as a tool to facilitate exchanges 
between buyers and suppliers is evolving as a new business prototype. It was after this  
experiment, a part of the Naval Supply Systems Command, in May 2000, tried Reverse 
Auction Bidding (Mabert & Skeels, 2002). 
During the same time, many  Fortune 1000 companies began tasting the benefits 
this new method of procurement (Emiliani & Stec, 2001). Web auctions of products like 
service or commodities are using sophisticated advertisement techniques to display the 
product being offered for sale. United Airline has started an online auction system for 
first class upgrade, this system has two similarities with Reverse Auction Bidding, the 
first one is that a group of bidders make offers for a special seat, the other one is the 
United Airline will select the best offer to maximize their returns, which is also the 
market driven for Reverse Auction Bidding. The overall expectation from this published 
research is that the overall average price for bids obtained using the Reverse Auction 
Bidding Process would be lower than a hard bid system.  
This statement has not been shown to be correct at this time, nor is ever likely to 
be provable.  
Reverse Auction Bidding in Construction Industry 
In construction, the use of Reverse Auction Bidding is increasing. At a scheduled 
time, the owners open a bidding site with a “game” and bidders who are interested in the 
project submit their price to the web-based system. Then the web-based system posts the 
prices on the site for all bidders to compete. Contractors can lower the price to win the 
bid in a certain period of time. Compared to traditional sealed bidding, in which all bids 
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from other bidders are kept confidentially, Reverse auction bidding provide 
opportunities for subsequent bidding after prices are open (Shankar, 2005). 
Some corporations use the Reverse Auction Bidding method to buy their 
construction materials. For instance, the Minnesota Department of Administration 
procure the construction products with the RAB method. In addition to the purchase of 
commodities, in a recent case, Pennsylvania’s Department of General Services also use 
the RAB technique procure construction services.  
Several private companies, such as Target have used Reverse Auction Bidding 
systems (Shankar, 2005; Yuan, 2013). 
Posited Savings for RAB 
One study indicated that a properly executed reverse auction has the potential to 
save an additional 8 percent to 20 percent cost for an organization below its current price 
(Guillemaud, Farris, & Hooper, 2002). The Minnesota Department of Administration 
benefited from the use of RAB, which enable the Minnesota Department of 
Administration drop the price of the aluminum it purchased from $1.555 per pound 
$1.029 in 45 minutes. The state achieved a saving of $150,000 for taxpayers about over 
the course of five years. As summarized by the state, “A reverse auction gets to the 
absolute lowest price a vendor will offer, as opposed to a bid price [under the traditional 
sealed bid approach] that might not be the bottom line price” (Shankar, 2005) 
RAB has its own flaws or challenges to not only sellers but also buyers, 
everything has two sides. Strategic relationships and partnership between buyers and 
sellers might be impaired. “Because of excessively focusing on price, the online reverse 
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auction has caused a move away from the close partnerships that were once successfully 
working for both buyers and sellers. An empirical study concluded that high emphasis 
on two main benefits of reverse auctions, purchase price reduction and time savings 
(procurement process efficiency), negatively impact the buyer-seller cooperation and 
sellers’ strategic relationships” (Pearcy & Larry, 2007). In order to win the bid, a seller 
has to lower its margin to a bare minimum. With such a low margin, there is no room for 
any adjusting and adapting to unforeseen situations. It can jeopardize long term buyer-
supplier relationships; reduce the suppliers’ trust and cooperation. Ultimately, it can 
even lead to the erosion of the supply base and result in less competition and higher 
prices. 
           Figure 2 clearly shows the problems with these claims. Results from earlier 
studies showed that the bidding set L has a distinct non-normal distribution when the 
data is normalized.  
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Figure 2: Normalized profit data for two earlier studies, after Saigaonkar (2010) 
 
 
 
A good game strategy can provide some players with returns higher than the 
average. Anecdotal evidence on Reverse Auction bidding shows that this happens in real 
systems. In terms of game theory, an auction can be considered a game between players. 
One player,  has a good for sale in a traditional auction and a good to purchase in a 
reverse auction.  
The other player,  is typically a group that is bidding to purchase the item in a 
traditional auction or sell the item in a reverse auction. The  player derives from the 
concepts put forward by Church (1941). The  player sees a different statistical 
distribution set for each player in the   group, but the   merely observes one statistical 
distribution set. These statistical distribution differences form the basic element to this 
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research work, as the point is to develop a machine bidder that outbids all human 
bidders, but is humanlike (Abelson, Sussman, & Sussman, 1987; Winston & Horn, 
1989). 
Procured Items 
The discussion, which questioned the feasibility of Reverse Auction Bidding of 
all kinds of products, has never stopped. Some researchers (Mabert & Skeels, 2002) 
studied some cases and concluded that Reverse Auction Bidding could not be suitable 
for every purchasing contract. Products, like strategic items and direct inputs, are not 
that accessible to Reverse Auction Bidding due to their long-term contract requirement 
or oligopoly among sellers, (Schoenherr & Mabert, 2007). The suitable ones included 
complex and highly-engineered items (Wagner & Schwab, 2004) or standard projects. 
Jap (2002) put forward that the only suitable products should be commoditized products.  
Schoenherr & Mabert (2007) explore this myths that Reverse Auction Bidding is 
commodities-products-only auction. They suggested having Reverse Auction Bidding 
for non-commodities products by refining the RFQ order, conducting market research 
and analysis, defining detailed and specific attributes of projects, and using specialized 
third-party consultant.  
Legal Issues 
As a new modern method of procurement, Reverse Auction Bidding attracted 
more and more attention from manufacturing and service sector business and 
government agencies. Its popularity also raised the concern of its legal and contractual 
issues. Research dealing with legal issue indicated that there was some unfair trade 
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practice (Engel & Emiliani, 2007) during Reverse Auction Bidding. The unfairness came 
from the unequal positions of buyer and sellers.  
Sellers were facing sort of coercion in Reverse Auction Bidding. Horlen, Eldin, & 
Ajinkya (2005) analyzed the future legal challenges of Reverse Auction Bidding in 
terms of some legal grounds, like Federal Trade Commission, Anti-Dumping Act of 
1916, Robinson-Patman Act, Clayton Antitrust Act and Business Method Patents. 
Reverse auction was banned by the Federal Acquisition Regulation (48 CFR 
245.610 and 48 CFR 15.610), because some flaws in legal performance (Merson, 2000), 
however, the prohibition was later removed. Though legal challenges existed in Reverse 
Auction Bidding awarded contract, Reverse Auction Bidding is still appealing to public 
buyer, like large international companies and government. The state of Texas, 
Pennsylvania, Kansas, New York State, Missouri, Minnesota, and Wisconsin (Horlen et 
al., 2005) had approved the legislation to allow Reverse Auction Bidding. 
Economically the system is transparent and one could argue fair for all parties, 
provided that a coercive relationship does not exist or the game is not rigged, 
(Giampietro & Emiliani, 2007).  
Buyer to Seller Relationship 
Since price became the relatively decisive element in Reverse Auction Bidding 
process, the expected side effect is the negative impact Reverse Auction Bidding might 
bring to the buyer-supplier relationship. It is possible that buyer may omit the non-price 
elements like reputation, quality and previous partnership etc. This may result in 
deterioration of previous seller-buyer partnership. People question whether Reverse 
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Auction Bidding can be used in procurement, which requires long-term seller-buyer 
relationship. Reversed auction was recognized to bring new business to new sellers who 
could offer lower price, while making current seller annoyed at losing the hard-won 
long-term business (Emiliani & Stec, 2005). Due to its price oriented characteristic, 
Reverse Auction Bidding could lead to profit margin erosion (Emiliani & Stec, 2004) 
and coercion to sellers. In construction industry, seller-buyer partnership could be 
impaired when contractors, who won the contract with lowest price in Reverse Auction 
Bidding, would charge higher prices for change orders and extra work if client ordered, 
in order to keep their profit margin (S.Wamuziri, 2009). 
While some researchers tried to refute by putting forward the idea that Reverse 
Auction Bidding could potentially benefit both sellers and buyers at the same time. 
Some researchers suggested that buyers, who need collaborative and long-term 
relationship sellers, can use Reverse Auction Bidding as a process improvement tools to 
check market price instead using it as a price weapon (Smart & Harrison, 2003). Also, 
the buyer-seller relationship can be kept fair to all by prequalifying bidders with non-
price elements, detailing RFQ, providing education, training and assistance to bidders 
during Reverse Auction Bidding process (Schoenherr & Mabert, 2007). 
An important economic observation is when all things are equal the prices should 
be the determining factor (Hartford, 2005) for projects funded by shared equity. Reinisch 
(2011) showed the problems with alternative bidding systems. 
Reverse Auction Bidding Myths and Reality 
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Schoenherr and Mabert (2007) studied 30 case studies for companies that had 
participated in RAB systems, which enable  them investigate the most common myths 
related with Reverse Auction Bidding. They discussed myths for Reverse Auction 
Bidding:  
 Reverse Auctions are only about the price;  
 Reverse Auctions are only suitable for commodities;  
 Reverse Auctions damage the buyer-supplier relationship;  
 Savings in Reverse Auctions will decrease;  
 Reverse Auctions are passing fad. 
Figure 1 shows the current myths about reverse auction in the industry. 
Schoenherr and Mabert (2007) studied the reality vesus the myths based on their study 
of 30 companies.  
The findings are: 
 While a lower price is one objective in reverse auctions, it is often not the 
most important one, and can be easily complemented with non-price 
attributes 
 While commodities are usually easier candidates for reverse auctions, non-
commodity items can also be put up for bid successfully 
 While reverse auctions can hurt buyer–supplier relationships, there are many 
ways to prevent that from happening 
 While first-time bidding events likely result in higher savings, continued cost 
advantages are possible 
  
 
 
20 
 While reverse auctions will not be used as much as in the past, they are here 
for the long-run. 
Influence of Personality Types to Reverse Auction Bidding Outcome 
Students from Texas A&M University have conducted studies on RAB for the last 
decade. The research was commenced by van Vleet (2004), the theoretical basis of the 
study is the simulated bidding process which reflected the project of supply of slabs in 
Houston. In the following year, Shankar (2005) tested the methods from van Vleet’s 
study and showed that the results could be replicated. Rogers (2010) suggested that 
personality may have an impact on returns.  
Further studies have been conducted by Machado (2009) and Saigaonkar (2010) at 
TAMU to analyze the bidders’ personality impacts on the results. The work is based on 
the Keirsey Temperament Sorter test. Keirsey Temperament Sorter is a self-assessed 
personality questionnaire designed to help people better understand themselves and 
others. The test and scoring method are presented in Appendix A and B respectively.  
The Keirsey Temperament Sorter test has seventy-one questions, and identifies 
sixteen types of personalities that fit into four groups SJ - The Guardians, SP - The 
Artisans, NT – The Rationales, and NF - The Idealists. The sorter matrix for this is 
shown in Table 1. 
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Table 1: 
Keirsey Temperament Sorter Matrix 
 Temperament Role Role Variant 
Introspective 
(N) 
Idealist (NF) 
Diplomatic 
Mentor (NFJ) 
Developing 
Teacher (ENFJ): Educating 
Counselor (INFJ): Guiding 
Advocate (NFP) 
Mediating 
Champion (ENFP): Motivating 
Healer (INFP): Conciliating 
Rational (NT) 
Strategic 
Coordinator (NTJ) 
Arranging 
Field marshal (ENTJ): Mobilizing 
Mastermind (INTJ): Entailing 
Engineer (NTP) 
Constructing 
Inventor (ENTP): Devising 
Architect (INTP): Designing 
Observant 
(S) 
Guardian (SJ) 
Logistical 
Administrator (STJ) 
Regulating 
Supervisor (ESTJ): Enforcing 
Inspector (ISTJ): Certifying 
Conservator (SFJ) 
Supporting 
Provider (ESFJ): Supplying 
Protector (ISFJ): Securing 
Artisan (SP) 
Tactical 
Operator (STP) 
Expediting 
Promoter (ESTP): Persuading 
Crafter (ISTP): Instrumenting 
Entertainer (SFP) 
Improvising 
Performer (ESFP): Demonstrating 
Composer (ISFP): Synthesizing 
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Table 2: 
Summary of the Individual Components of the Different Personality Types 
#  Name Meaning 
E Extraversion Feel motivated by interaction with people. Tend to enjoy a wide 
circle of acquaintances, and gain energy in social situations 
N Intuition More abstract than concrete. Focus attention on the big picture 
rather than the details, and on future possibilities  
F Feeling Value personal considerations above objective criteria. In making 
decisions, often give more weight to social implications than to 
logic 
J Judgment Plan activities and make decisions early. Derive a sense of 
control through predictability 
I Introversion Quiet and reserved. Generally prefer interacting with a few close 
friends rather than a wide circle of acquaintances, and expend 
energy in social situations 
P Perception Withhold judgment and delay important decisions, preferring to 
"keep their options open" should circumstances change 
T Thinking Value objective criteria above personal preference. When making 
decisions, generally give more weight to logic than to social 
considerations 
S Sensing More concrete than abstract. Focus attention on the details rather 
than the big picture, and on immediate realities rather than future 
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This research has shown tentatively that the major personality type of Guardian 
always gives best performance in comparison to the other personality types. But in the 
recent study conducted by (Piper, 2013), three guardians are beaten by an idealist. This 
requires further studies and demonstrates the complexity of the personality problems. A 
significant amount of work has been completed on personality impact at TAMU, clearly 
personality is one factor that affects performance. 
Mathematical Theory of the Reverse Auction Bidding 
The earliest research was interested in the ethical issues associated with Reverse 
Auction bidding systems. The main conclusion is that a purchaser is free to use a RAB 
system to purchase good, there are however several issues: 
 If only a single bid is submitted it is not likely to be at the lowest cost 
 Single bids occur frequently even in competitive games 
 humans make mistakes and miss things 
This mathematical theory has been used to review a number of case studies 
completed at TAMU, both with graduate students and now a set of four professional 
estimators (Piper, 2013). (Guhya, 2010) defined the bidders as Type   to represent a 
more economically effective bidder and as Type   to represent a less economically 
effective. Nichols (2010) defined Type    Bidder as bidders who is within the middle of 
the range for complete the set L  . Type   have not yet been formally and statistically 
observed (Nichols, 2010).   
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(Guhya, 2010) also discussed the Mathematical Theory of the Reverse Auction 
Bidding. Consider a Reverse Auction Bidding game where the   player is willing to 
accept bids of the type shown in equation (1): 
 j j    ,       (1) 
  Represents the upper limit the   player is prepared to pay in the game above 
the nominal minimum bid amount . A negative   represents a loss on direct costs to 
the i player who makes this type of bid, and enough of these bids will lead to a 
bankrupt player. The concept of  can be attributed to Professor Feigenbaum (Guhya, 
2010), who considered there had to be an upper limit everyone was prepared to pay for a 
service or good.  
The bidding period for each game lasts for a set time,  in this case it is 15 
minutes. The total cost for    player is shown in equation (2): 
1
n
v j
j
   ,        (2) 
This total cost is based on the accepted lowest bid for each job, where a valid bid 
was submitted by the    player. Each i  player then has a unique set of bids and a 
unique set of jobs, with a total return to the i  player defined by a simple summation. 
The results of this statistical analysis using equation (1) and (2).  
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Figure 3: Normalized profit levels for the four player game 
 
 
 
There are clearly two elements to the distribution, which has been consistent 
across game play from the earliest studies.  
Current Analysis 
The current stage in the analysis is to analyze the statistical properties of the profit 
drop on each bid, where the lost profit on a bid is defined as kL  . It is postulated that the 
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statistical analysis of the sets of lost profit, k
L  , data will provide an indicator of the 
quality of the players. The data set of interest is shown in equation 3. 
1
i i i
j j jB    ,      (3) 
Bid Arrivals 
A research group has studied the arrival time of eBay bidding (Shmueli, Russo, & 
Jank, 2007). They stated that the arrival time of eBay bidding will fit the BARISTA 
model. The BARISTA (Bid ARrivals In STAges) is a three-stage nonhomogeneous 
Poisson process. The first stage is “espresso stage” (short and intense), in which the 
biding start. The second stage is called macchiato stage” (stained), which is during the 
mid-auction period with increasing intensity. The third stage is last moment of bidding, 
called “ristretto stage” (extra intense). In this stage, there are extremely intensive 
activities. This study gives instructions about the best time to bid. A Poisson process is a 
special type of Markov process that happens in a fixed consecutive time period (Boxma 
& Yechiali, 2007). As a continuous-time process, it is a mathematical model of a 
completely random series of events (Cox & Lewis, 1966). 
Yuan (2013) analyzed 6674 reverse auction bidding bid arrival times for nine 
previous TAMU reverse auction bidding case studies. Table 3 shows the individual 
Reverse Auction bidding games used by Yuan.  
A Poisson process counts the numbers of occurring events along the timeline and 
the time of the occurred events in a certain time interval. According to its characteristics, 
it is also a type of point process of the real half line. Yuan as can be seen in Table 3 
found that the results show that the Poisson process model for the arrival times fits the 
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non-homogeneous Poisson process (NHPP) model. The results from her study have the 
similar heterogeneity in RAB bidding dynamics to the situations of eBay online auction 
that were studied by others (Russo, Shyamalkumar, Shmueli, & Jank, 2004; Shmueli, 
Russo, & Jank, 2004; Shmueli et al., 2007). 
 
Table 3: 
Reverse Auction Games Studied by Yuan 
Experiment 
Date 
Researcher 
ID 
No. of 
Contractors 
No. of 
Section 
No. of 
Projects 
No. of Bids 
5/4/2004 1 5 8 86 773 
5/29/2006 2 4 25 118 192 
6/4/2006 3 9 13 156 1077 
11/5/2007 4 4 5 43 346 
4/6/2010 5 5 8 54 804 
4/3/2010 6 37 10 179 776 
6/8/2010 7 4 10 97 865 
6/10/2010 8 4 9 92 759 
6/11/2010 9 4 9 91 1082 
TOTAL 9 76 97 916 6674 
 
 
Figure 4 shows a plot of the bid arrival times for the ninth case study, completed 
in November 2010. The data shows the bids pack into the higher end of the bidding time 
of 900 seconds, with most bids in the period 700 to 900 seconds.  
  
 
 
28 
 
 
Figure 4: Bid arrival time data for case study nine 
 
 
 
 Yuan had divided the 900 seconds of game play into 180 intervals of five 
seconds each. She counted the arrival times for each 5 second interval for the complete 
data set. The results are plotted in Figure 5. The process has a theoretical upper limit of 
infinity, but one is constrained by the speed of human typing. Yuan in a simple study 
showed that a cutoff number of bids per second existed and determined this value. She 
showed that the upper limit of 140 matches the value reasonably.  
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Figure 5: Bid arrivals for complete set 
 
 
 
The author concluded from the analysis that reverse auction bidding bid arrival 
times follows a Poisson process, as for the eBay data (Shmueli et al., 2007). 
One of the main issues over the last decade, relates to the issue of timing. The 
game is played on the internet, the clock time on the various devices may be different 
and most likely are, causing issues on determining “finish time” for each game. This is 
not a trivial issue, and one that should be of concern to all involved in such games. 
Summary 
As an innovative procurement method, the application of RAB is increasing and 
developed. This literature review introduces existing procumbent methods and their 
characteristics. Previous researched mainly studied on its external effects of RAB, such 
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as potential savings, the applicable industry, related legal issues and effects for the 
relation between buyers and seller. Further studied discussed the advantages of Reverse 
Auction Bidding, which mainly discusses the cost savings; while, the some researchers 
also imply that Reverse Auction Bidding has its flaws, such as impairing the long-term 
seller-buyer relationship. 
The published article studying RAB dynamics (biding strategies and bidders’ 
performance) is rare, while some researchers studied the eBay auction performance. 
Because the eBay online auction and the Reverse Auction Bidding have significant 
similarities in bidding process, this literature review referred some studies on eBay 
online auction. Russo (2010) has studied the arrival time of eBay bidding. She stated that 
the arrival time of eBay bidding will fit the BARISTA model. The BARISTA (Bid 
ARrivals In STAges) is a three-stage nonhomogeneous Poisson process. The first stage 
is “espresso stage” (short and intense), in which the biding start. The second stage is 
called macchiato stage” (stained), which is during the mid-auction period with 
increasing intensity. The third stage is last moment of bidding, called “ristretto stage” 
(extra intense). In this stage, there are extremely intensive activities. This study give 
instructions about the best time to bid. Yuan (2013) analyzed the bidding data of Reverse 
Auction Bidding from previous 9 experiments from TAMU, and the results have the 
similar heterogeneity in RAB bidding dynamics to the situations of eBay online auction 
that were studied by other Russo (2010). van Vleet (2004) started the ongoing study of 
Reverse Auction Bidding at Texas A&M University. This research continues today with 
twenty-four studies completed to date. The theoretical basis of the RAB study is the 
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simulated bidding process, using the supply of house slabs in Houston. The work is 
repetitive and simple, the participant is assumed to have a work capacity of three slabs 
per week, a rain element is introduced to provide a random element to the ability to 
complete work and the bank is willing to increase additional capacity for a fee, although 
for historical reasons the fee is termed a loan.  
Not all of the studies are suitable for use in this study, because of constraints 
introduced by the research question of interest to a particular study, such as owner’s 
interference. Nine studies had data suited to this study.  
Studies have been conducted  by Machado (2009), Guhya (2010) and Saigaonkar 
(2010) at TAMU to analyze the bidders’ personality impacts on the RAB returns. The 
studies are based on the Keirsey Temperament Sorter test. There have been studies in the 
areas of game theory, tacit collusion among bidders, the significance of personality, the 
RAB game for the role variants of guardians in different types of industrial and some 
specific cases studies. 
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CHAPTER III 
METHODOLOGY 
 
The Reverse Auction Bidding System used for this research has developed through 
three stages as follows: 
1. An Access database and ASP system was used for the earliest studies (Shankar, 
2005; van Vleet, 2004) 
2. Gregory (2006) found that with ten bidders attempting to access the system 
simultaneously that the Access database failed to allow access to all participants. 
Wellington developed a SQL Server based version of the ASP website.  
3. Nichols in 2013 developed an ASP.NET MVC4 (Piper, 2013) front end for the 
SQl Server database. The purpose of this revision is to improve the time taken to 
analyse the data. 
 
 
 
Figure 6: Reverse Auction Bidding Logon Screen 
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The game rules are: 
1. Each game last twenty minutes 
2. Each bidder has access to the site using a controlled login id and password, as 
shown in Figure 6. 
3. Game play lasts for 15 minutes followed by five minutes of break 
4. A set of dice are used to determine the number of games per week with the 
minimum equal to the number of dice and maximum three times the number 
of players 
5. Each bidder has the capacity to bid on three jobs and is given a bank amount 
of $40000 at the start of the game.  
6. Conditions are assumed to be economically stable 
7. Price controls exist to stop low bids and extremely high bids, this is based on 
work by (Gujarathi, 2008; Panchal, 2007) on price ranges for staple goods. 
8. The work is assumed to be house slabs for a homebuilder, which is repetitive 
work on six sites located around Houston as shown on Figure 7, the detailed 
locations are mentioned in Table 4. 
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Figure 7: Construction Site in Houston (after MapQuest, 2006) (Guhya2010) 
 
 
Table 4: 
Location of the Construction Sites in Houston (Guhya, 2010) 
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Figure 8: All current bid screen from RAB website 
 
 
In this game the bidder is only allowed to bid lower than a previous bid as it is a reverse 
auction. The following warning, will be shown on the screen if a bidder tries to bid a 
higher amount that the current bid. A sample of current bid screen is shown in Figure 8. 
 
Figure 9: Higher than acceptable bid web statement 
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Figure 9 shows a warning that is seen when the bidder makes an invalid bid. Similar 
warning message is issued when the maximum number of bids by the bidder is reached 
as shown in Figure 11. Below in Figure 10 we can see a sample of the Bid Screen during 
the progress of the game.  
 
 
 
Figure 10: Summary of bids screen 
   
 
Data Structure 
There are twenty four research studies completed by previous master’s students at 
TAMU. Eight high quality data sets were used for this analysis. Table 5 summarizes the 
detailed information about the data sets used in this analysis. Other sets were discarded 
because of issues including, ten players in the game and owner’s interference in the play.  
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Table 5: 
Study List 
Study 
No 
 
Student Name Participants 
1 
 
Van Vleet 5 
4 
 
Gujarathi 4 
9 
 
Saigaonkar 4 
11 
 
Gupta 4 
12 
 
Patel 4 
14 
 
Plumber 4 
15 
 
Bedekar 4 
16 
 
Katakam 4 
 
 
Table 5 shows a sample of the bid data taken from the first study. 
 The data is stored during the game in a SQL Server database. There are a total of 
six tables in the database. SQL-Table 1 holds the log data for the people logged onto the 
computer system. SQL-Table 2 holds the company names and login details. A company 
name is given to each player so that their confidentially is maintained during the game. 
SQL-Table 3 holds the job data, including start and end times. The numbers of jobs per 
week are determined using a set of die. SQL-Table 4 holds the bid data as shown below 
on Table 6 holds the weather delay data and SQL-Table 6 holds the summary of the 
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construction details. A number of integer flags are used to control data flow because a 
web site is essentially stateless (Paz, 2013).  
 
 
Figure 11: Bank guarantee web form 
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Table 6: 
Bid Data – Sample after van Vleet (2004) 
 
Bid ID Job ID Ctr ID Bid Amount Bid Date Bid Time Bid Status 
1 1 9 $15,000.00 1 7:00:20 PM 0 
2 1 8 $13,000.00 1 7:00:22 PM 0 
3 3 9 $12,000.00 1 7:00:31 PM 0 
4 2 8 $14,000.00 1 7:00:53 PM 0 
5 1 4 $12,999.00 1 7:01:02 PM 0 
6 4 4 $20,000.00 1 7:01:25 PM 0 
7 12 6 $12,825.00 1 7:01:28 PM 0 
8 2 7 $13,500.00 1 7:01:29 PM 0 
9 5 9 $12,000.00 1 7:01:34 PM 0 
10 4 7 $15,000.00 1 7:01:36 PM 0 
11 1 8 $12,500.00 1 7:01:39 PM 0 
12 4 7 $14,000.00 1 7:01:48 PM 0 
13 7 8 $16,000.00 1 7:01:50 PM 0 
14 2 7 $13,000.00 1 7:01:54 PM 0 
15 11 4 $12,700.00 1 7:01:58 PM 0 
16 13 6 $20,000.00 1 7:01:59 PM 0 
17 6 8 $12,500.00 1 7:02:06 PM 0 
18 4 4 $13,999.00 1 7:02:14 PM 0 
19 1 4 $12,400.00 1 7:02:21 PM 0 
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The stored data is: 
 Bid Id   consecutive integer 
 Job Id   Job number applied to a particular site and day 
 Ctr Id   Bidder Identity number used for the program 
 Bid Amount  Offer  
 Bid Date  Each week is numbered, 1, 2, 3 etc… 
 Bid Time  Time that the bid is offered by the bidder 
 Bid Status   Reserved for program use 
Table 7 shows a sample of the control data used for the game. The data is in four 
groups: 
 Identity Number used to record all details in the SQL Server database as 
the key identity. Five is reserved for system use 
 Name, Logon Name and Password. The logon name is usually a simple 
name such as shown here and does not link to the actual player 
 Capacity  current weekly capacity  
 Loan amount and the amount taken in bank loans 
It is suggested for future research purposes that the loan data include the timing of 
the loan data, so that the impact during particular rounds of the games can be studied 
effectively. The weekly capacity is recalculated at the end of each week to allow for rain 
and non-completion of some jobs and at the time of taking out a bank loan. 
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Table 7: 
Reverse Auction Bidding Control Data 
ID Name Username Password Capacity Loan 
1 Doc Beith Butcher 3 $0.00 
2 Grumpy Coll WillGrimm 3 $0.00 
3 Happy Duir HalfPint 3 $0.00 
4 Sleepy Gort Napoleon 3 $4,000.00 
5 Reserved for system use 
6 Bashful Muir Grub 3 $2,500.00 
7 Sneezy Nion Chuck 3 $8,500.00 
8 Dopey Quert Wolf 3 $2,000.00 
9 Stealthy Gus Lenny 3 $11,000.00 
 
Table 8 shows an example of the job and profit details. The data columns are: 
 Control ID the contract number to identify each unique job 
 ID player identity number, if 5 then not awarded 
 Job ID the job identity number in the job list, some jobs may not be 
awarded 
 Cost for the job including base, travel, delivery and site costs 
 Profit for the job as a gross profit 
 Delay number of days of delay in the job due to rain 
 UC reserved for system use 
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 Begin Date are numbered 1, 2, 3, etc. so a week is seven days, 
commencing with Day 1 as a Monday, Sunday is observed as a day of 
rest as is common in the construction industry 
 End Date at the end of the contract, if equation 4 is true then there has 
been no impact on the capacity due to rain 
4EndDate BeginDate       (4) 
Table 8: 
Profit and Job Data 
Control 
ID 
ID Job 
ID 
Cost Profit Delay UC Begin  
Date 
End  
Date 
1 4 1 $10,350.00 $1,650.00 0 5 2 6 
2 4 5 $10,350.00 $1,400.00 0 5 2 6 
3 9 13 $10,000.00 $900.00 0 5 2 6 
4 7 2 $10,450.00 $1,650.00 1 5 2 7 
5 4 3 $10,450.00 $1,549.00 1 5 2 7 
6 6 4 $10,450.00 $1,550.00 1 5 2 7 
7 7 7 $10,700.00 $1,600.00 2 5 2 8 
 
 
Petersen (2010) studied the performance of ξ bidders. The bid amounts for this 
game are shown on Figure 12. 
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Figure 12: Bid distribution from RAB study ten after Petersen (2010) 
 
 
 
Data Analysis 
Guhya (2010) developed a number of the techniques used for the analysis of the 
Reverse Auction Bidding data, based on the work of the earlier researchers. The first 
stage in the data analysis is to sort the bid data for each different bidder. Figure 12  
shows a sample of the bid data from RAB Study Number 10 (Petersen, 2010).  
The data of interest is the bid reduction at each step of the play. This data can be 
collected from a sorted data set.  
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Table 9: 
Game 10 Bid Data Sample 
Bid Number Job Number Participant Bid Amount 
4750 1368 4 15450 
4741 1368 2 15550 
4733 1368 4 15582 
4730 1368 2 15600 
4713 1368 4 15850 
4710 1368 2 16000 
4708 1368 4 16750 
4707 1368 2 16800 
4701 1368 4 16890 
4700 1368 1 17000 
4698 1368 4 17400 
4696 1368 2 17500 
4691 1368 4 17520 
4675 1368 2 18000 
4661 1368 4 18500 
4653 1368 2 19000 
4643 1368 6 19999 
4619 1368 2 20000 
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The price reduction data is collected and then sorted into different bin range: 
between 1 and 10, between 10 and 100, between 100 and 1000, between 1000 and 
10,000, and 10,000 above. Figure 13 shows the counts of the number of bid drops made 
by Participant 1 in RAB Research Number Four.  
 
 
Figure 13: Frequency of different profit level 
 
 
The figure shows that the bidder reduced the total bid group by $82,077. This 
represents a significant portion of the available profits.  
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CHAPTER IV 
RESULTS 
 
Introduction 
This chapter provides a summary of the results for the analysis of the several 
games used for this study. These games are from the current study as well as 
comparisons from the previous studies.  
Summary of the Study Data 
This research is in continuation of the Research on Reverse Auction bidding 
games completed at Texas A&M University since 2004. Table 10 lists the studies used 
in this research work.  
Table 10: 
Study Results Summary 
Study 
No 
Participants 
Number of 
Bids 
Maximum 
Bid 
Minimum 
Bid 
Winning 
Bidder ID 
1 5 698 $1,200,000 $2,000 9 
4 4 347 $300,000 $133,335 3 
9 4 903 $60,000 $12,898 12 
11 4 865 $62,000 $11,700 2 
12 4 759 $64,000 $12,499 1 
14 4 1282 $60,416 $12,000 4 
15 4 708 $35,000 $11,800 1 
16 4 403 $64,000 $11,900 1 
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Table 10 shows the study number, relating to the order of the studies in the 
overall research work, the number of participants, the number of bids, the maximum bid 
and the minimum bid. Games are played by unique participants with construction 
knowledge, although a player was once used twice. Figure 14 shows a plot of the bid 
data for the original study by van Vleet (2004).  
 
 
Figure 14: Study number 1-bid data 
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The other importance of the above Figure 10 is the variation in the maximums of 
the bid. The results pointed the need for conceptual development of the upper limit to the 
bid price. An upper bid limit was introduced by Gujarathi (2008) to provide an upper 
limit price point to match the real world limits, which is 3.5 times the base price and 
include the travelling and delivery costs. The costs for travel and delivery are updated 
and reflect cost conditions. This idea stems from the reasonable concept that the 
purchaser has the economic sense to understand values that are economically excessive 
(Hartford, 2005).  
Figure 14 shows the early stage of low bids, which was studied and formalized by 
Chouhan (2009). The bid of $2000 at a time when the average bid is $20,000, is the type 
of error that will lead to a court case or a broken relationship as most small contractors 
cannot absorb such a loss, although it might be a problem of typing errors. This issue 
was fixed with the introduction of the check on low prices. There is also a bid limit of 
0.9 times the base costs; this is in place to catch typing errors that would otherwise spoil 
the game data. Occasionally bid data includes losses instead of profits. Dharamshi 
(2014) Recently completed a three game study; the 24
th
 study in this research set. The 
third game in Dharamshi’s study shows atypical results including a number of losses and 
unusal profit levels. This game will be discarded for future analysis.  
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Figure 15: Number of bids per job 
 
 
 
The key observations are the issue of flagging interest after job number 40, the 
high number of bids in the early game play, which leads to an erosion of profit, but it 
slows down and for the rest of the game the bids are lesser and profits are substantial. 
This observation on flagging interest has led to the standard eight round game, which 
based on an average of 7 to 8 jobs per game yields about 50 to 60 jobs in each game.  
In studying the profits levels between games, the method developed by Guhya 
(2010) was to normalize the profit using equation (1). Guhya’s method is applied to the 
profit on each job.  
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Figure 16: Previous RAB study – bid amounts 
 
Figure 16 shows the bid amounts plotted against the bid numbers for RAB Study 
4. Figure 17 shows the issue with the binning procedure, the maximum drop in price is 
18,000, which does not fit into the 10,000 bin, but is included in the 100,000 bin. 
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Figure 17: RAB study 25- bid amounts 
 
 
Figure 18 shows the complete bid drop data plotted as a histogram for the set of studies 
used in this research.  
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Figure 18: Study set: bid drop count 
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Figure 19: Bids per minute current study 
 
 
 
The Figure 19 above shows that most of the bids by the players was done in initial phase 
of the game and the bidders were not too concerned towards the end. There seems to be 
only 2 bids in the entire game made in the last minute.  
 
  
 
 
54 
 
 
Figure 20: Profit and loan trends for current study 
 
 
The Profit to Loan graph for this population is slightly different from the previous 
studies of RAB. There is also a case of higher loan and lower profit, but the general 
trend seems to remain that higher the loan amount better profits were made by the 
bidders. 
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Figure 21: Bid Profits in each job. 
 
 
The sample population used in this study follows similar trends to previous studies and 
shows that initially the bidders did try to win jobs by making lesser profits, later the 
bidders were careful and made significantly higher bids. Also since the number of bids 
for the jobs decreased over time it shows that the bidders agreed that making profit was 
important rather than winning jobs.  
  
 
 
56 
 
Figure 22: Rank according to number of jobs won. 
 
 
 
An analysis of the rank order plotted against games per rank is shown in the 
Figure 23. The results shown above clearly show that profit being related to the number 
of jobs won in the games. This is a reasonable relationship and is thus of interest to the 
researchers. This area deserves further research.  
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Figure 23: Bid differential data – all studies 
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Feigenbaum (2014) Opined that a procedure existed to beat the bidders who 
brought down by just a dollar. The technique was to make an offer that is fundamentally 
lower, indicating that the bidder is aggressive and the key bidder might look for benefits 
somewhere else. This example inquiry is a different study. 
The hypothesis is a non-homogeneous Poisson process (NHPP) models the arrival 
time data for bidding from a number of new TAMU case studies within acceptable 
statistical limits. 
A Poisson process is a special type of Markov process that happens in a fixed 
consecutive time period (Boxma & Yechiali, 2007). As a continuous-time process, it is a 
mathematical model of a completely random series of events (Cox & Lewis, 1966). 
This study found that the results show that the Poisson process model for the 
arrival times doesn’t fit the non-homogeneous Poisson process (NHPP) model. The 
results from this study doesn’t have the similar heterogeneity in RAB bidding dynamics 
to the situations of eBay online auction that were studied by others (Yuan 2013; Russo, 
Shyamalkumar, Shmueli, & Jank, 2004; Shmueli, Russo, & Jank, 2004; Shmueli et al., 
2007). 
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CHAPTER V 
CONCLUSION 
 
van Vleet started the study of Reverse Auction Bidding (RAB) game at Texas 
A&M University in 2004. This research work now extends to twenty four studies by 
Masters Students in the Department. This thesis investigates aspects of the Reverse 
Auction system using the web site developed by others to continue the work on 
understanding aspects of the impact of human personality types on the bidding results 
for a standard game. 
Reverse Auction Bidding is utilized by a significant number of enterprises for 
supply of materials and in part construction. These companies are generally convinced 
that the Reverse Auction Bidding framework enhances the effectiveness of the offering 
bid, by reducing costs, and helps spare a considerable measure of expense throughout the 
development process and bid times. The assumption that one achieves savings in using 
this method is not proven.  
A game theory was developed for the Reverse Auction Bidding framework used at 
TAMU to study the results of the bids collected in a standard game. This theory 
postulated two sub-games exist inside the main Reverse Auction Bidding game. The 
main sub-game is between the buyer and the set of bidders. The second sub-game is 
between the bidders. The theory exists that the buyer seeks minimal costs, which must 
be acknowledged as prima facie correct for this study. Extent studies at TAMU have 
indicated that the costs distribution is non-Gaussian, indicating that the buyer’s objective 
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is not achieved for all bidders. The second sub-game is between the bidders, they utilize 
the non-Gaussian component of the profit distribution to amplify individual returns. 
Bidders have been proposed into three types, the first is a monetarily productive bidder, 
a financially wasteful bidder, and a mid-range bidder. Personality has been shown to 
have some impact on the determination of a participant’s economic efficiency.  
The bid timing data from previous studies shows that the bid arrival times follows 
a Poisson process. This study aims to confirm the previous investigation that the bid 
timing data from the Reverse Auction Bidding case studies at TAMU fits the non-
homogeneous Poisson process model. 
The study involves a game scenario consisting of six construction sites for which 
the participants were asked to bid on the construction of house slabs. This is a simple 
and repeatable construction to minimize the problems of bidding. The study also 
involved determining the personality type of the participants. The game lasts for eight 
rounds. 
The individuals were selected from the Construction Management Graduate 
program with varied experience. The statistical results of the bidding data show patterns 
not similar to the previous studies. The hypothesis is a non-homogeneous Poisson 
process (NHPP) models the arrival time data for bidding from a number of new TAMU 
case studies within acceptable statistical limits. This result had been confirmed in a 
previous study looking at a large number of games. This set of players made limited 
bids, made a significant amount of bidding in the early minutes of the game and bid low 
relative to the game limits. These players performed in an interesting fashion, as they are 
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part of a Poissonian process, this type of anomalous play is rare, but it happens. It is rare 
in the Poissonian process, but given that about 40 games have now been played one of 
this form should not be unexpected. The game now forms part of the data set of all 
games. The personalities were all Guardians. All Guardian games have been shown to 
elicit poor performance for the entire group in two previous studies. In determining the 
recommendations for future studies, one is mindful of the need to understand the 
economically efficient bidders first and the economically inefficient bidders second. The 
interest is in why bidders win. Games of all Guardians are not further recommended. 
The hypothesis is neither proven nor disproven; the results from this study are moot to a 
large extent, except when included in the overall study of all of the games.  
A further study is suggested to combine a bid arrivals study and profit strategy to 
look for the strategies for optimum price and most awards. 
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APPENDIX A  
THE KEIRSEY TEMPERAMENT SORTER 
 
For each question, decide on answer a or b and put a check mark in the proper column 
of the answer sheet.  Scoring directions are provided.  There is no right or wrong 
answers since about half the population agrees with whatever answer you choose.  
KEIRSEY TEMPERAMENT TEST QUESTIONS : Keirsey, D. (1998)   
For each question, decide on answer a or b and put a check mark in the proper 
column of the answer sheet.  Scoring directions are provided.  There is no right or wrong 
answers since about half the population agrees with whatever answer you choose.   
1. When the phone rings do you 
a. hurry to get to it first 
b. hope someone will answer 
2. Are you more 
a. observant than introspective 
b. introspective than observant 
3. Is it worse to  
a. have your head in the clouds 
b. be in a rut 
4. With people are you usually more 
a. firm than gentle 
b. gentle than firm 
5. Are you more comfortable in 
making 
a. critical judgments 
b. value judgments 
6. Is clutter in the workplace 
something you 
a. take time to straighten up 
b. tolerate pretty well 
7. Is it your way to  
a. make up your mind quickly 
b. pick and choose at some length 
8. Waiting in line, do you often 
a. chat with others 
b. b.  stick to business 
9. Are you more 
a. sensible than ideational 
b. ideational than sensible 
10. Are you more interested in  
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a. what is actual 
b. what is possible 
11. In making up your mind are you 
more likely  
a. to go by data 
b. to go by desires   
12. In sizing up others do you tend to 
be 
a. objective and impersonal 
b. friendly and personal 
13. Do you prefer contracts to be 
a. signed, sealed, and delivered 
b. settled on a handshake 
14. Are you more satisfied having 
a. a finished product 
b. work in progress 
15.   At a party, do you 
a. interact with many, even 
strangers 
b. interact with a few friends 
16.   Do you tend to be more 
a. factual than speculative 
b. speculative than factual 
17. Do you like writers who 
a. say what they mean 
b. use metaphors and symbolism 
18. Which appeals to you more: 
a. consistency of thought 
b. harmonious relationships 
19. If you must disappoint someone are 
you  
a. usually frank and 
straightforward 
b. warm and considerate 
20. On the job do you want your 
activities 
a. scheduled 
b. unscheduled 
21. Do you more often prefer 
a. final, unalterable statements 
b. tentative, preliminary statements 
22. Does interacting with strangers 
a. energize you 
b. tax your reserves 
23. Facts 
a. speak for themselves 
b. illustrate principles 
24. Do you find visionaries and 
theorists 
a. somewhat annoying 
b. rather fascinating 
25. In a heated discussion, do you 
a. stick to your guns 
b. look for common ground 
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26. Is it better to be 
a. Just 
b. merciful 
27. At work, is it more natural for you 
to 
a. point out mistakes 
b. try to please others 
28. Are you more comfortable 
a. after a decision 
b. before a decision 
29. Do you tend to 
a. say right out what’s on your 
mind 
b. keep your ears open 
30. Common sense is 
a. usually reliable 
b. frequently questionable 
31. Children often do not 
a. make themselves useful enough 
b. exercise their fantasy enough 
32. When in charge of others do you 
tend to be 
a. firm and unbending 
b. forgiving and lenient 
33. Are you more often 
a. a cool-headed person 
b. a warm-hearted person 
34. Are you prone to 
a. nailing things down 
b. exploring the possibilities 
35. In most situations are you more 
a. deliberate than spontaneous 
b. spontaneous than deliberate 
36. Do you think of yourself as 
a. an outgoing person 
b. a private person 
37. Are you more frequently 
a. a practical sort of person 
b. a fanciful sort of person 
38. Do you speak more in  
a. particulars than generalities 
b. generalities than particular 
39. Which is more of a compliment: 
a. “There’s a logical person” 
b. “There’s a sentimental person”  
40. Which rules you more 
a. your thoughts 
b. your feelings 
41. When finishing a job, do you like to 
a. tie up all the loose ends 
b. move on to something else 
42. Do you prefer to work 
a. to deadlines 
  
 
 
70 
b. just whenever 
43. Are you the kind of person who 
a. is rather talkative 
b. doesn’t miss much 
44. Are you inclined to take what is 
said 
a. more literally 
b. more figuratively 
45. Do you more often see 
a. what’s right in front of you 
b. what can only be imagined 
46. Is it worse to be 
a. softy 
b. hard-nosed 
47. In trying circumstances are you 
sometimes 
a. too unsympathetic 
b. too sympathetic 
48. Do you tend to choose 
a. rather carefully 
b. somewhat impulsively 
49. Are you inclined to be more 
a. hurried than leisurely 
b. leisurely than hurried 
50. At work do you tend to 
a. be sociable with your colleagues 
b. keep more to yourself 
51. Are you more likely to trust 
a. your experiences 
b. your conceptions 
52. Are you more inclined to feel 
a. down to earth 
b. somewhat removed 
53. Do you think of yourself as a  
a. tough-minded person 
b. tender-hearted person 
54. Do you value in yourself more that 
you are 
a. reasonable 
b. devoted 
55. Do you usually want things 
a. settled and decided 
b. just penciled in 
56. Would you say you are more 
a. serious and determined 
b. easy going 
57. Do you consider yourself 
a. a good conversationalist 
b. a good listener 
58. Do you prize in yourself 
a. a strong hold on reality 
b. a vivid imagination 
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59. Are you drawn more to 
a. fundamentals 
b. overtones 
60. Which seems the greater fault 
a. to be too compassionate 
b. to be too dispassionate 
61. Are you swayed more by 
a. convincing evidence 
b. a touching appeal 
62. Do you feel better about 
a. coming to closure 
b. keeping your options open 
63. Is it preferable mostly to  
a. make sure things are arranged 
b. just let things happen naturally 
64. Are you inclined to be 
a. easy to approach 
b. somewhat reserved 
65. In stories do you prefer 
a. action and adventure 
b. fantasy and heroism 
66. Is it easier for you to 
a. put others to good use 
b. identify with others 
67. Which do you wish more for 
yourself: 
a. strength of will 
b. strength of emotion 
68. Do you see yourself as basically 
a. thick-skinned 
b. thin-skinned 
69. Do you tend to notice 
a. disorderliness 
b. opportunities for change 
70. Are you more 
a. routinized than whimsical 
b. whimsical than routinized  
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APPENDIX B 
KEIRSEY TEMPERAMENT SORTER SCORING  
 
Keirsey, D. (1998) Enter a check for each answer in the column for a or b. 
Table 11:  
KTS Scoring 
 
 a b  a b  a b  a b  a b  a b  a B 
1   2   3   4   5   6   7   
8   9   10   11   12   13   14   
15   16   17   18   19   20   21   
22   23   24   25   26   27   28   
29   30   31   32   33   34   35   
36   37   38   39   40   41   42   
43   44   45   46   47   48   49   
+50   51   52   53   54   55   56   
57   58   59   60   61   62   63   
64   65   66   67   68   69   70   
 1   23 
3    
  43    45    65    67    87    
         
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
3     4 
 
S N 
 
1     2 
 
E I 
 
5     6 
 
T F 
 
7     
 
J P 
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Directions for Scoring 
1. Add down so that the total number of a answers is written in the box at the bottom 
of each column.  Do the same for the b answers you have checked.  Each of the 14 
boxes should have a number it. 
2. Transfer the number in box #1 of the answer grid to box #1 below the answer 
grid.  Do this for box # 2 as well.  Note, however, that you have two numbers for 
boxes 3 through 8.  Bring down the first number for each box beneath the second, as 
indicated by the arrows.  Now add all the pairs of numbers and enter the total in the 
boxes below the answer grid, so each box has only one number. 
3. Now you have four pairs of numbers.  Circle the letter below the larger numbers of 
each pair.  If the two numbers of any pair are equal, then circle neither, but put a 
large X below them and circle it. 
 
